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It has been consistently demonstrated that deceivers generally can be discriminated from
truth tellers by monitoring an increase in their physiological response. But is this still the
case when deceivers interact with a virtual avatar? The present research investigated
whether the mere “belief” that the virtual avatar is computer or human operated forms a
crucial factor for eliciting physiological cues to deception. Participants were interviewed
about a transgression they had been seduced to commit, by a human-like virtual
avatar. In a between-subject design, participants either deceived or told the truth about
this transgression. During the interviews, we measured the physiological responses
assessing participants’ electrodermal activity (EDA). In line with our hypothesis, EDA
differences between deceivers and truth tellers only were significant for participants who
believed they interacted with a human operated (compared to a computer operated)
avatar. These results have theoretical as well as practical implications which we will
discuss.
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INTRODUCTION
Automated deception detection is one of the biggest security challenges for the twenty-first century.
More than ever, governments and border agencies are interested in fast, reliable and low-intrusive
ways to detect deception in crowded and vulnerable places such as airports (Lu et al., 2010; Damos
et al., 2013; Aradau, 2015). The main goal is to quickly filter out those who are low at risk and to
flag potential deceit (Derrick et al., 2011; Twyman et al., 2014). A promising approach to meet this
goal is to use “automated interview systems” (AIS), which conduct structured interviews and assess
deviations in the interviewee’s physiology and behavior via sensors (Burgoon and Nunamaker,
2004; Nunamaker et al., 2011; Twyman et al., 2014).
Despite the variety in interfaces, AIS are based on the underlying principle of physiological
lie detection; that deception is accompanied by increases in sympathetic nervous system (SNS)
activity. This increase is attributed to increased anxiety, negative emotional states, and cognitive
demand (Ekman and Friesen, 1969; Zuckerman et al., 1981; Vrij, 2008). Today, AIS are technically
advanced enough to sense fluctuations in SNS activity. By sensing and interpreting increases in
interviewees’ physiological responses, AIS in security contexts have shown promising but mixed
results in terms of detecting deception (Derrick et al., 2011; Nunamaker et al., 2011; Twyman et al.,
2014). Moreover, we do not know much yet about the underlying factors that makes AIS successful
deception detectors.
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A critical unanswered question is: Will deceivers’ SNS
activity increase, knowing they “just” talk to a computer? From
interpersonal deception theory (IDT; Buller and Burgoon, 1996)
we know that in real face-to-face encounters pressure is put on
the deceiver, because deceivers continuously have tomanage their
expressions in response to suspicion. As a result, emotional stress,
cognitive load, and attempted behavioral control increase during
deception in interpersonal interactions (Zuckerman et al., 1981).
However, these processes are arguably moderated by the type
of interpersonal context in which deception takes place (Buller
and Burgoon, 1996). The question is whether AIS, operated by
computer algorithms, induce similar interpersonal processes in
deceivers. Specifically, in a face-to-face encounter, deceivers likely
experience fear of getting caught by the interviewer, and put
much effort in acting convincingly and therefore often closely
monitor themselves and the reactions of the person they deceive
(DePaulo et al., 1988; Buller and Burgoon, 1996; Schweitzer et al.,
2002; Vrij, 2008). It is questionable whether deceivers exhibit
such behavior, knowing their conversation-partner neither is
human nor has consciousness. If this is the case, a crucial element
for the effectiveness of deception detection with AIS is whether or
not deceivers “believe” the system is human or merely computer
controlled.
Research demonstrated that people have difficulties to
determine whether they interact with a human or a computer
controlled entity. For instance, a study based on Milgram’s
“cyranic illusion” paradigm (Milgram, 1992) showed that
participants in a human face-to-face interaction did not notice
that their human conversation partners just voiced the words
of a computer algorithm in real-time (Corti and Gillespie,
2015a,b). With regards to the content therefore, computers
seemingly are capable of being perceived as humans. Moreover,
Turing (1950, p. 434) already concluded that when placing
the conversation in a context that naturally prevents people to
see and touch the “other,” there is “[. . . ] little point in trying
to make a ‘thinking machine’ more human by dressing it up
[. . . ].” Nowadays, such a context can simply be created using
a computer-mediated-communication setting (Schroeder, 2011).
Lucas et al. (2014) demonstrated for instance that one could
let individuals believe that they interacted with a real human
or with a computer by simply introducing a virtual avatar as
human or computer operated. In fact, an avatar that “looks”
and “talks” as a human to convince people might not even
be necessary: A study by Morkes et al. (1999) successfully
led people to believe that they communicated with a real
person in a text-based chat, which actually was a computer
algorithm.
Importantly, when providing no clear framing of the “other”
as either human or computer operated, people for the identical
AIS generally strongly differ in the extent to which they
believe they interact with a human or a computer (Schuetzler
et al., 2014). The question is whether such perceptions have
consequences for how deceivers respond to AIS. There is first
evidence that “believing” a virtual avatar is human, opposed to
computer, operated indeed alters the behavior toward virtual
avatars. A study testing the capability of virtual avatars in clinical
screening interviews showed that participants who thought they
interacted with a human, disclosed less information and showed
higher impression management than participants who perceived
the avatar as computer operated (Lucas et al., 2014). According
to the authors these results may be explained by an increased
feeling that responses are currently judged when indirectly
talking to a human. Whereas, in a clinical interview this is
disadvantageous, in a deception detection context this may be
beneficial.
A higher awareness of being judged would likely help to evoke
more cues to deception in a deception detection context. AIS
therefore maybe more effective when deceivers perceive such
a system as human rather than computer controlled. Indeed,
a study by Schuetzler et al. (2014) demonstrated that making
an AIS’s communication skills more human-like—by building
in an adaptive response model—not just increased perceived
humanness but also induced faster responses and reduced
speech pauses among deceivers. The authors ascribed this to
the fact that during deception, deceivers try to maintain their
normal pattern of behavior (Buller and Burgoon, 1996). We
therefore expected that in order to induce physiological cues
to deception, perceiving an AIS as human operated is crucial,
and hypothesized that, compared to truth-tellers, deceivers
who perceive AIS as computer operated would not differ
with respect to SNS activity, whereas deceivers who perceive
the AIS as human operated would show an increase in SNS
activity.
The Current Study
The aim of the current study was to investigate whether
perceiving an automated interview system as operated by a
human or computer, influences cues to deception in the form of
increased SNS activity. Therefore, we conducted an experiment
wherein participants were led to believe they participated in a
so-called in-basket exercise to test management skills. During
the game they were “seduced” to commit fraud by signing a
document they were not allowed to. They were then interviewed
about this transgression in a structured manner by a human-
like avatar on a screen. When confronted with human-like
avatars, people generally are uncertain to which degree the avatar
really directly represents the actions and thoughts of the person
controlling that avatar (Schroeder, 2011). During the interview
we measured the participant’s electrodermal activity (EDA), the
most frequently used measure in the field of physiological lie
detection (Vrij, 2000). EDA directly reflects SNS activity and
can bemeasured unobtrusively within onemeasurement (Wallin,
1981; Dawson et al., 2007; Boucsein, 2012).
In a between-subject design we then let participants deceive
the avatar by either lying on all questions or only on the
crucial question regarding the signature (which was at the end
of the interview). We included the latter condition, because
it mirrors real-life deception more closely than when people
constantly lie (see Ströfer et al., 2014 for a discussion). Both
deception conditions were compared with a condition where
participants told the truth. After the interview we assessed
whether participants believed the avatar was human or computer
operated using a self-report scale.
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METHODS
Participants
We conducted an experiment with 107 graduate students
participating in exchange for e5. Because of the limited
availability of the computer system running the avatar, and long
duration of each experimental session we were somewhat limited
in the number of participants we could run.We therefore decided
to run as many participants as possible in the available period
of 7 weeks. Thirteen participants refused to sign the document
that served as basis for the experiment and were excluded from
analyses. The data of eight participants who did not follow
the instructions of the experiment were excluded as well1 and
due to technical problems we failed to record EDA data for
another seven participants. Therefore, analyses were based on 792
participants (mean age= 21.88, SD = 2.84, range= 18–30 years;
41 women). Participants provided written informed consent,
and the institutional review board approved the experimental
protocol.
Experimental Design and Procedure
The experiment consisted of a one-factorial (veracity condition:
truth, lie or intention to lie) between-subject design3. Participants
were randomly assigned to the veracity condition. Participants
believed they would take part at a test session for an ostensible
newly developed assessment center test (ACT; Sackett and
Dreher, 1982). We employed this cover story to allow for
deception in a realistic setting. At the start of the experiment we
explained to the participants that the ACT consisted of several
exercises and that the three best participants completing these
exercises each would win 50 e4. We further explained that all
tasks of the session were relevant for the prize and that we would
clearly state when the experiment was finished. On average,
the experimental sessions lasted for 1 h. Each session was run
by an experiment leader and two confederates: One acting as
“experiment assistant” and the other as “interviewer.”
In-Basket Exercise
The experiment started with an in-basket exercise, which often
is part of an ACT (Dukerich et al., 1990). Participants were
invited to assume the role of a manager of a transport company
and to substitute a regular employee who currently was on sick
leave. Participants were required to complete four tasks normally
executed by the sick employee in 15min. In the third task
participants read a contract that had to be signed by the sick
employee—as was indicated by the name of the employee that
1One participant failed to follow the instructions in the truth, four participants in
the lie, and three in the intention condition. The subject in the truth condition
committed a technical “fault,” one participant in respectively the lie and intention
condition refused to follow the instruction, and the other participants ostensibly
were so demanded/stressed that they did not manage to follow the instructions
(e.g., constantly lie).
2The 28 of 107 participants who had to be excluded were randomly divided across
conditions.
3The original design also contained interview style (information-gathering vs.
accusatory style) as an additional between-subject factor. Analyses with this factor
did not render any significant effects and therefore was eliminated from further
analyses.
4In reality, the money was allotted among the participants after the experiment.
was already printed on the contract. A note explained that the
contract was important for the company and had to be signed
urgently. Most of the participants (88%) signed the contract,
since this is an easy and fast solvable problem, and continued
with the fourth task. However, signing a document under a wrong
name is legally not allowed. This transgression served as input for
our deception experiment.
EDA Baseline Measurement and Confrontation
After finishing the in-basket exercise, participants were brought
to the interview room. In order to get an EDA baseline, we
attached participants to skin conductance sensors and asked
them to sit down for 5min and relax and wait for the next
task of the experiment. We informed participants that this
measure assessed the difficulty of the in-basket test. After 5min
the experiment leader entered the room again, stating that she
reviewed the participant’s output of the in-basket tasks, but
that a problem occurred regarding one of the documents. The
experiment leader then confronted the participant with the fact
that (s)he signed a document (s)he was legally not allowed to sign,
and informed that (s)he therefore would be interviewed about
this incident by an intelligent virtual agent.
Introduction of the Virtual Avatar
The virtual avatar (see Figure 1) was introduced as an intelligent
agent who would appear on the screen (which was turned off
during the baseline measurement) in front of the participant.
The experiment leader stressed that the virtual agent could hear
and see them and that they could talk to him in a normal
way. Although in reality the avatar was operated by a human
(the experiment confederate), it remained ambiguous to the
participants whether or not the avatar acted autonomously
or not.
FIGURE 1 | The avatar (“Brad”) used as a virtual agent in the present
experiment (Hartholt et al., 2013).
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Experimental Manipulation
After introducing the virtual agent, participants were randomly
assigned to a veracity condition. They received a letter advising
on the best approach to behave in the upcoming interview
about their transgression. This letter formed the experimental
manipulation consisting of three veracity conditions: a truth, a
lie, and an intention to lie condition. In the truth condition,
the letter advised participants to tell the truth on all questions,
including questions about whether one signed the document.
In the lie condition, the letter advised to lie on all questions,
including questions about whether one signed the document.
Finally, in the intention condition, the letter advised to tell
the truth on all questions but to lie on questions whether one
signed the document. We highlighted the question regarding the
signature in the truth and lie conditions as well to prevent that
the question about the signature would get special meaning in the
intention condition only. Hereby we aimed to prevent differences
in prospective memory demands between conditions. Finally, we
reminded participants that how well they followed the advice
would affect their chances for the prize money.
The Interview with the Virtual Agent
Interview questions
After the participant finished reading the letter the experiment
leader turned on the screen and the virtual agent emerged. Then
the experiment leader left the room and the interview started. The
interview was fully standardized, with the virtual agent asking a
total of 10 questions in a fixed order (see Table 1). Each interview
started with a number of general questions and worked its way
up to the key question revealing the evidence: “Is this your
signature on this document?” Thereafter the interview ended
with two closing questions. During the interview, participants’
EDA was recorded. After the interview the experiment leader
entered the room again and asked participants to fill in some final
questionnaires, including a short measure assessing the degree to
which participants thought the avatar was human or computer
controlled.
Operation of the Virtual Agent
The virtual agent was portrayed by VHToolkit avatar “Brad”
(Hartholt et al., 2013) and appeared on a screen in front of the
participant. The virtual agent was operated out of eye shot of
the participant from the experiment confederate. The operator of
the virtual agent could hear and see the participant on a separate
screen and therefore was able to react to the participant’s speech
in real-time. The operator let the avatar successively ask the 10
interview questions. A new question was selected whenever the
participants finished answering the preceding one. In addition,
the avatar showed visual and verbal cues of natural listening
behavior by for example making short brief utterances such as
“M-mh,” “Yes,” and “Ok” while the conversation partner is talking
in order to increase the credibility of the virtual agent (Krauss
et al., 1977; Heylen et al., 2011). Also, the operator could choose
unspecific answers to evade situations in case the participant asks
back questions such as “Do you want me to tell more?” The
operator could choose out of a set of answers such as “Just go
on” (see Table 2).
TABLE 1 | The interview consisted of 10 questions.
Question Content
1 Can you tell about your link with the university? How often and
why you are here, what exactly are you doing here?
2 Why did you come to University today?
3 Can you describe step by step what you have done after your
arrival?
4 Did you encounter other people? Who?
5 Can you give any other additional information?
6 Did you participate in an assessment center test?
7 In front of you lies a map. Please open it. Have you seen this
document before?
8 Is this your signature?
9 Do you want to add something?
10 Was everything clear?
Questions 9 and 10 were not included in the statistical analyses, since these form
the closing part of the interview and were contently not relevant for our experimental
manipulation.
TABLE 2 | Options the operator used to evade counter questions by the
participant.
Repertoire of evading answers the operator could give
Ok
Yes
No
Just go on
Whatever you want
That is for you to decide
Please give an answer
Measures
Perception of Virtual Agent
We assessed the degree to which participants perceived they
interacted with a human or computer with a self-report measure.
Our scale was based on the original Turing test (Turing, 1950)
in which the test-person interviewed a physically separated real
human and an intelligent computer and had to decide which
of the two conversation partners is human and which not. In
line with more recent studies based on the Turing test, we used
a self-report scale assessing the degree to which participants
believe they interacted with a real human or a computer (Person
et al., 2002; Ijaz et al., 2011; Schuetzler et al., 2014). Participants
completed five items such as “I think the virtual agent was
controlled by [. . . ]” or “I think the questions were selected by
[. . . ]” on a 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (A human)
to 7 (A computer), Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80. A factor analysis
on these five items (method: maximum likelihood, based on
Eigenvalues greater than 1) revealed one single underlying factor,
explaining 56.02% of the variance, corroborating the intention to
measure one construct: the believe in whether an Avatar is human
or computer controlled. We therefore created an overall score
by computing the mean value for the scores on the five items
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(Distribution of scores across participant sample: Mdn = 3.40,
M = 3.52, SD = 1.59, Range: 1–7).
Electrodermal Activity (EDA)
Recording
EDA was recorded continuously with 256Hz from baseline till
the end of the interview (down-sampled to 16Hz during off-
line analysis). EDA was recorded exodermal (constant voltage)
via skin conductance using skin conductance sensors (Thought
Technology Ltd., Montreal West, Quebec, Canada), attached to
the distal phalanx of the right index and ring fingers (Boucsein,
2012). The signal was amplified using ProCompInifiniti amplifier
(Thought Technology Ltd.) and was recorded in µS.
Analyzing
To assess physiological arousal during the interview, we executed
a Continuous Decomposition Analysis using Ledalab (Benedek
and Kaernbach, 2010) which is an algorithm written in
MATLAB. We focused on tonic EDA which describes the overall
conductivity of the skin over longer time intervals and can be
operationalized by the skin conductance level (SCL; Figner and
Murphy, 2010). To assess tonic EDA during the interview, we
subtracted the SCL during the interview from the SCL during the
baseline measurement5. As recommended by Boucsein (2012),
EDA was normalized by taking the natural logarithm. Statistical
analyses were performed on log-transformed data, but the
reported descriptive statistics were based on the raw data (in µS).
RESULTS
Demographics across conditions were equally divided between
veracity conditions and therefore were not included in further
analyses. To test the hypotheses, we conducted a multiple
regression to test whether perceiving the avatar as human
operated, increases cues to deception in form of tonic EDA (see
Table 3). All data assumptions for linear models were met (Field,
2013). We ran a regression model with the standardized scores
of avatar perception, two dummy variables dummy coding the
experimental conditions, and two interaction terms as predictors.
For the dummy variables we used the truth condition as reference
condition. Dummy 1 compared the lie condition (lying = 1,
intention = 0, and truth = 0) and Dummy 2 the intention
condition (lying = 0, intention = 1, truth = 0) to the truth
condition.
In line with our hypothesis, we found a significant effect of
Dummy 1, β = 0.37, t(71) = 2.34, p = 0.023, revealing that
SCL was higher in the lie (M = 2.29, SE = 0.28) compared to
truth condition (M = 1.47, SE = 0.29). This effect was qualified
by a significant and medium (Cohen, 1988) interaction effect of
Dummy 1 and avatar perceptions, β = −0.46, t(71) = −2.77,
p = 0.007. Simple slopes analyses (Aiken et al., 1991) revealed
5We verified the results by also using another way of calculating tonic EDA.
Employing CDA analysis by Benedek and Kaernbach (2010), we used the average
phasic driver activity across the interview as dependent variable in the regression
model. This estimates the phasic activity of the electrodermal activity which
overlays the skin conductance level (Figner and Murphy, 2010). Similar significant
patterns were found using the phasic driver activity as using the SCL.
that for participants who perceived the avatar as relatively human
operated (1 SD from mean toward human anchor) SCL was
significantly higher in the lie than in the truth condition, β =
0.83, t(71) = 3.63, p = 0.001. However, for participants
perceiving the avatar as relatively computer operated (1 SD from
mean toward computer anchor), the difference in SCL between
the lie and truth condition disappeared, β=−0.08, t(71) = −0.35,
p = 0.726 (see Figure 2).
A similar pattern was found when comparing the intention
with the truth condition. Although the main effect of Dummy
2 was not significant, β = 0.32, t(71) = 1.85, p = 0.068, the
effect size indicates a medium effect in the predicted direction,
showing that SCL was higher in the intention (M = 1.80,
SE = 0.32) compared to the truth condition (M = 1.47,
SE = 0.29). The interaction effect of Dummy 2 with perceptions
TABLE 3 | Multiple regression table: Regression Beta’s predicting EDA.
Predictor Model 1 Model 2
β p β p
Dummy 1 0.37 0.029 0.37 0.022
Dummy 2 0.30 0.104 0.32 0.068
Avatar perception (z-score) 0.01 0.873 0.23 0.033
Dummy 1 × Avatar perception −0.46 0.007
Dummy 2 × Avatar perception −0.30 0.086
High scores on the Avatar perception scale indicate that participants believed to interact
with a computer rather than a human. Dummy 1 contrasts the lie to the truth condition
and Dummy 2 the intention to the truth condition.
FIGURE 2 | The interaction effect between condition and the perceived
operation of the avatar on tonic EDA. The bars with standard error present
the predicted tonic EDA value for people who score 1 SD from the mean
toward the computer anchor and 1 SD toward the human anchor on the
perceived avatar operation scale within the three veracity conditions.
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of the avatar was not significant, β = −0.30, t(71) = −1.74,
p = 0.086 (see Figure 2). But also here the effect size indicates an,
albeit medium, effect in the predicted direction. That is, simple
slopes analyses showed that for participants who perceived the
avatar as more human operated (1 SD from mean toward human
anchor) the difference in SCL between the intention and truth
condition was significant, β = 0.62, t(71) = 2.58, p =
0.012. However, for participants who perceived the avatar as
computer operated (1 SD from mean toward computer anchor)
there was no significant difference in SCL between the intention
and truth condition, β = 0.02, t(71) = 0.10, p = 0.924.
As expected, the tonic EDA differences between the truth and
respectively the lie and intention condition thus became larger
when participants believed the avatar would be human instead of
computer operated.
We also examined the condition by perceptions interaction
effects by conducting a simple slopes analysis of avatar
perceptions within the veracity conditions. This analysis enables
us to see whether there are EDA difference within each veracity
condition depending on whether participants perceived the
avatar as human or computer-controlled. When participants
believed the AIS was computer instead of human operated,
simple slopes analyses within each veracity condition revealed
that in the truth condition EDA significantly increased, β = 0.23,
t(71) = 2.18, p = 0.033, whereas in the lie condition, tonic EDA
seem to remain the same, β = −0.22, t(71) = −1.77, p = 0.080.
However, a small effect size revealed a trend that participants
EDA in the lie condition decreased as they believed the AIS
was computer instead of human operated. In the intention
condition, EDA was not influenced by the degree to which
participants believed they interacted with a computer, β = −0.06,
t(71) = −0.48, p = 0.633.
DISCUSSION
Automated physiological lie detection may work—but the results
of our study suggest that it is crucial that deceivers believe that
the system they are interacting with is controlled by another
human and not by an intelligent computer. In the current
study we examined deceivers who interacted with a virtual
avatar about whom they were uncertain whether it was human
or computer operated. We found that the degree to which
participants perceived they interacted with a human controlled
avatar intensified cues to deception in the form of heightened
SCLs, a common marker for psychophysiological lie detection
(Vrij, 2008). In line with our hypothesis, EDA differences
between deceivers and truth tellers became significantly more
pronounced when participants believed they interacted with a
human operated avatar. When participants perceived the avatar
as computer operated, there was no difference between truth
tellers and deceivers. There was a medium effect suggesting
that this difference in EDA between deceivers and truth-tellers
seem to be still present, even when deceivers only lied on one—
crucial—question regarding the transgression. This last finding
has important practical significance, because in reality deceivers
tend to tell the truth as much as possible and only lie on crucial
parts in a conversation (Strömwall et al., 2006; Leins et al.,
2013).
Moreover, the present results showed that both deceivers as
well as truth-tellers may be affected by their perceptions of AIS.
That is, as predicted, part of the decline in EDA differences
between lying and truth telling when the avatar was perceived
as more computer than human-operated, could be explained by
a trend, showing a decrease in EDA when people perceived the
avatar as being computer (vs. human) operated and were lying.
Additionally, we also—unexpectedly—found that EDA increased
when people perceived the avatar as computer instead of human-
operated and were telling the truth.
Based on IDT (Buller and Burgoon, 1996), we indeed
predicted that a virtual avatar which is believed to be computer-
operated might not elicit the typical psychological responses
(such as an increase in monitoring processes) typical for
deceivers compared to truth-tellers. In interpersonal interactions
perceivers usually believe their lies shine through and therefore
experience a greater sense of awareness with regard to their
performance than truth tellers (Gilovich et al., 1998; Elaad, 2003;
Vrij, 2008). Despite the technical abilities of current AI systems
to conduct an interview and to sense physiological arousal,
today’s AIS however just “pretend to act like” humans instead of
being one. AIS, for instance, have no consciousness in terms of
noticing the presence of themselves in the world (Khanna et al.,
2015), which may have important consequences for how people
socially respond in interactions with AIS. For example, a study
by Schuetzler et al. (2014) demonstrated that deceivers exhibit
shorter response latencies and pause lengths when deceiving a
chat bot which was perceived asmore human-operated compared
to a chat bot that was perceived as computer-operated. The
authors explained this by the fact that deceivers felt a greater
sense of urgency to respond quickly due to their desire to appear
truthful when interacting with a human-operated system.
Similarly, deceivers who assume to talk to an unconscious
computer which does not “understand” the conversation on
a social level may feel less pressure to monitor the course of
the deceptive conversation on a meta-level such as they would
do when talking to a real human (Buller and Burgoon, 1996).
Consequently, deceivers may be less engaged in monitoring
behavior and feel no need to maintain a normal (unsuspicious)
conversation while deceiving. Perceiving an AIS as computer
rather than human-operated thus indeed should result in less
demanding cognitive and affective processes and, consequently,
lower EDA normally associated with deception (Spence et al.,
2001; Vrij, 2008).
In addition, the present results revealed that truth tellers
showed an opposite pattern: EDA increased to the extent to which
truth-tellers believed the avatar was operated by a computer
and decreased to the extent to which they believed the AIS
was operated by a human. This result implies that also for
truth-tellers’ physiological reactions perceiving an AIS as a
conscious social being vs. a socially inapt computer may be
crucial—and specifically so in the current setting. That is, truth
tellers generally believe that their innocence automatically shines
through (Gilovich et al., 1998; Vrij, 2008). In the present study
truth tellers were in fact not innocent, because they did put an
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unauthorized signature on the document. Participants however
did not commit the transgression on purpose, and may see it
as minor transgression which would not be a big problem to
admit when explained. It may be possible that truth tellers might
have felt that an AIS controlled by a socially aware human would
understand their good intentions, but that a computer directed
system would completely miss this aspect of their transgression,
and would judge them strictly on the basis of their actions.
Recommendations and Limitations
With the rise of new technology, the findings of the current study
not only have theoretical but also practical relevance. From a
theoretical view, it supplements the IDT by Buller and Burgoon
(1996) who emphasize the importance of interpersonal contact
and interactivity in communication for cues to deception. We
supplement these factors by adding “believing” to communicate
with a real human being as a third crucial factor for cues to
deception. When using an AIS in a physiological lie detection
context, it may be important to indicate to interviewees that
the avatar is human controlled—as this can help to better
discriminate between honest and deceitful persons.
The ultimate aim of a AIS in a security context is to detect
deception in high-stake contexts such as border control—where
the stakes for the deceiver often are high—and consequences
of failing to detect deceit severe. Unlike previous studies,
where participants are explicitly instructed to commit something
unlawful (e.g., Kircher et al., 1988; Verschuere et al., 2004; Gödert
et al., 2005), we therefore used a paradigm which maximize
ecological validity. Participants were “seduced” to commit a
transgression and were subsequently advised how to respond
when being interviewed. This should increase the participant’s
agency and increase the stakes (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sip
et al., 2008). Research on the behavioral correlates of deception
show that particularly high-stakes lies are more difficult for
the deceivers and associated with intense emotions (Porter
and Brinke, 2010). Corroborating the high-stakes nature of the
current paradigm there were more participants having difficulties
following the deception instructions (in the lie as well in the
intention condition) than participants following the truth-telling
instructions. However, this also resulted in more participants
being excluded from the lie and intentions conditions than the
truth condition (see Footnote 1), which may have caused a bias in
participant selection. The consequences for the current results of
this difference in drop-outs should be limited because, the stress
and cognitive demand these participants were experiencing when
attempting to follow the instructions should increase EDA. Thus,
including these subjects in the analyses (if this would have been
possible), if anything would have increased the mean EDA in the
lie and intention conditions, making the differences between the
truth vs. the lie and intention condition even more pronounced.
Moreover, we found small effects, suggesting that also truth
tellers may be differentiated from deceivers who only lied on
one crucial question and for the rest of the interview stuck to
the truth. Similar to the lie condition, it seems however crucial
that the interviewees believed that a human operated the virtual
interviewer. This finding is of great practical relevance as real-life
deceptive attempts typically consist for a great part of truth telling
(with the intention to lie) and only a few literal lies (Carlson et al.,
2004; Strömwall and Willén, 2011; Leins et al., 2013). The reason
for this is twofold: Staying close to truth is easier and costs less
effort (Leins et al., 2013), and it reduces chances of being caught
by for instance delivering contradicting information (Hartwig
et al., 2010).
The current as well as previous work (e.g., Schuetzler et al.,
2014) show that people naturally differ in the extent to which they
perceive an AIS as being human controlled or an autonomously
computer controlled system. Having established that the “mere
belief” to communicate with a real human is crucial, we also
recommend manipulating experimentally the actual operation
of the avatar and belief of how the avatar is operated (see for
example Lucas et al., 2014). Another interesting question for
future research is why people differ in the perceptions of such
systems. This may be correlated with certain personality traits
such as emotional stability (e.g., Vries et al., 2009), or for instance
tied to the level of experience someone has with how computer
systems operate.
Our findings also have broader implications for the field
of deception detection. Deception is defined as “creating in
another a belief which oneself considers to be untrue” (Vrij,
2008). Deception thus by definition is an interpersonal activity,
including a deceiver and target to deceive. However, a lot of
physiological deception studies neglect that deception takes place
within a context of social interaction and study deception in
isolation. By placing the emphasis on a clean and controlled study
environment, it often is neglected that deception by definition is
socially rooted (Sip et al., 2008). The deceptive activity however—
whether it is literary lying, bluffing or omitting facts (Carlson
et al., 2004)—by its own nature is associated with “mentalizing”—
“the ability to predict and explain the mental states of other
people [. . . ]” (Grezes et al., 2006). Deceivers need to keep track
what the target to deceive knows and thinks to anticipate the
deceptive course of action (Sip et al., 2008). Therefore, the target
to deceive plays a crucial role for the psychological processes
underlying deception. Hence, it should be beneficial for detecting
cues to deception to let the suspect communicate with—or at least
believe to communicate with—a real human being.
CONCLUSION
One of the challenges of the twenty-first century is automated
deception detection. The current study discovered a crucial
ingredient that makes such systems work—the belief that one is
talking to a human instead of an autonomous computer-operated
system. We advise research and security industry to take this
into account when putting the results of experimental studies
into real-life applications such as an automated interview system
for deception detection. Already existing AIS are technically
sophisticated and even “look” human-like by means of an avatar
interface (Derrick et al., 2011; Nunamaker et al., 2011). The crux
of matter however may be not that these systems look human-
like, but that they are perceived as human-operated. In other
words, the suspects have to have the belief that they talk to a
conscious human through the virtual avatar and not a machine.
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